Michael Callen (JFK) will present:

"Using Preference Estimates to Customize Incentives: An Application to Polio Vaccination Drives in Pakistan"

at 3pm on Friday, September 30, 2016 in 310 Silsby


Please sign up for a meeting, lunch, or dinner at:

https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1bzUNEKHfao0UYdocVa-JuyoLVRohFtlpwTSkZrfgL8w/edit?usp=sharing


<https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1bzUNEKHfao0UYdocVa-JuyoLVRohFtlpwTSkZrfgL8w/edit?usp=sharing>

Abstract


We use structural estimates of time preferences to customize incentives for a sample of polio vaccinators during a series of door-to-door vaccination drives in Pakistan. Our investigation proceeds in three stages. First, we measure time preferences using intertemporal allocations of vaccinations. Second, we derive the mapping between these structural estimates and individually optimal incentives given a specific policy objective. Third, we experimentally evaluate the effect of matching contract terms to individual discounting patterns in a subsequent experiment with the same vaccinators. This exercise provides a test of the specific point predictions given by structural estimates of time preference. We document present bias among vaccinators and find that tailored contracts achieve the intended policy objective of smoothing intertemporal allocations of effort.





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