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June 2018, Week 4

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Subject:
From:
"Karen M. Pelletier" <[log in to unmask]>
Reply To:
Karen M. Pelletier
Date:
Wed, 27 Jun 2018 16:49:40 +0000
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Hans Normann, visiting the Economics Department from Germany for the summer as part of the Harris Fellowship will be presenting some of his work on experimental game theory at a lunch talk this Thursday June 28, from noon to 1:15 in the seminar room (Silsby 310).  He has a new approach to lab games---running them in continuous = real time---that is closer to real life and helps clarify the theory and empirics, so should be of general interest. Realizing this is the summer, we tried to make it particularly convenient for everyone---it will be held during lunch, food will be provided, and it will be a bit shorter than the usual 1.5 hour block.

Best,

--Chris Snyder

Speaker: Hans Normann, Duesseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE)

Title: GENERAL 2x2 GAMES WITH COUPLED POPULATIONS: AN EXPERIMENT IN CONTINUOUS TIME

Abstract: We propose a model of coupled population games where intra- and intergroup interactions overlap. We analyze the general class of symmetric 2x2 games with coupled replicator dynamics. Standard one- and two-population predictions extend to a total of ten regions with different sets of attractors, among them novel hybrid points where one population randomizes and the other plays a pure strategy. We complement the theoretical analysis with a continuous-time laboratory experiment using 48 different variants of coupled games. Observations confirm the theory to a large extent, but we also find a number of systematic deviations. When the attractors' eigenvalues are weaker, play converges to steady states located farther from the prediction and subjects engage in more trial-and-error experimentation.

Time: noon to 1:15, Silsby 310, Thursday June 28

Please RSVP to Karen Pelletier by early tomorrow morning -  [log in to unmask]

----------------------------------------------------
Christopher Snyder

Department of Economics
301 Rockefeller Hall
Dartmouth College
Hanover, NH 03755

tel: 603-646-0642
fax: 603-646-2122
email: [log in to unmask]
office: 312A Silsby Hall
web page: http://www.dartmouth.edu/~csnyder/
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