https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1GGEvcdfO1JIofQ9mYRGklA9qEVib2PP7AqZ5N-eRcSc/edit?usp=sharing
Abstract
This paper develops a model in which the decision to seek an HIV test is a signal of infection, and those who seek a test are subject to statistical discrimination from potential sexual partners. We evaluate an information experiment designed to test the
theory, and find evidence that this form of discrimination is a significant barrier to HIV testing. In particular, we provide information at the community level on the public benefit of antiretroviral therapy: because the drugs prevent HIV transmission, a
person who is tested and treated for HIV is a relatively safe sexual partner. This information reduces discrimination and increases HIV testing, with the strongest effects in communities where the new information becomes common knowledge. The results demonstrate
that discrimination towards HIV positive individuals can be due to rational behavior by a misinformed public, and that providing new information can be an effective way to mitigate its effects.